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these claims) and the distribution of scarcity among the
inhabitants of the region. Hillel (1994) places the
question of Middle East water scarcity in its proper
natural scientific and historical context. The
proceedings of the first international conference on the
Arab-Israeli water conflict (which took place in
Switzerland in 1992) are presented by Isaac and Shuval
(1994). Lonergan and Brooks (1995) provide a
comprehensive interdisciplinary analysis of the conflict
that highlights, among other obstacles, the difficulties
associated with poor data sharing and availability. Lowi
(1995) offers an analysis informed by the theories of
power dynamics and interstate behavior in the
international relations literature, while Wolf (1995)
examines the degree to which water scarcity may have
driven political and military decisionmaking (the socalled “hydraulic imperative”). Abouali (1996) offers a
criticism of the current distribution of water resources
based on several bodies of international law. Allan
(1996) points out that the international food trade has
had an important influence on the regional water
conflict because cereal and vegetable imports amount to
imports of “virtual water.” (Virtual water is the water
manifest in agricultural products. Imported grains or
vegetables can – indeed, should – be thought of as
imported water. This point is particularly noteworthy
since food self-sufficiency in the region, given even
present populations, is simply not a possibility. Food
self-sufficiency in the lands of Israel, Jordan, the
Palestinian territories, and the portions of southwestern
Syria located within the Jordan-Yarmuk watershed
would require an annual freshwater stock of some 7.2 x
109 m3 (BCM), a value well above the renewable volume
of freshwater that is available even in years of
extremely high precipitation.3) Elmusa (1998) offers an
additional political-economic perspective as well as
revisiting the unratified yet influential Johnston
agreement. Haddad and Feitelson (Haddad et al. 1999;
Haddad and Feitelson 1997; Haddad and Feitelson
1994a; Haddad and Feitelson 1994b) coordinated five
years of policy-oriented research on an aquifer system
whose hydrologic boundaries span the border between

ABSTRACT
Proposed resolutions to the Arab-Israeli water conflict
that fail to consider the introduction of alternative
freshwater sources in the not-too-distant future cannot
be taken seriously. Each of three major forms of
freshwater supply augmentation (the “unconventional
supplies”) is likely to be implemented on a widespread
basis in the region, thereby substantially altering the
regional water balance. These unconventional supplies
are desalination, water imports, and the reclamation of
wastewater. This paper assesses the relevance of the
unconventional supplies in achieving regional
accommodation over shared and scarce freshwater, with
particular attention to the advantages, disadvantages,
and complexities introduced by wastewater reclamation.
INTRODUCTION
The water resources shared by Israel, Jordan, the
Palestinian Territories, and Syria1 are not sufficient to
meet human freshwater demand. The shared waters in
question include the Jordan River and its tributaries,
several coastal rivers whose watersheds encompass both
Israeli and Palestinian territory (See Figure 1), and two
aquifer systems whose hydrologic boundaries straddle
the “Green Line,” the border between the West Bank
and Israel proper (See Figure 2). Annual human use of
the region’s water resources currently surpasses the
“safe” or sustainable2 annual freshwater yield by nearly
500 MCM/annum. Future deficits are projected to range
from 800 MCM to 3.4 x 109 m3 (BCM)/annum by the year
2040 (NAS, 1999). The scarcity of freshwater in the
region, compounded by (1) the impairment of existing
resources by a variety of pollutant inputs, and (2) the
historic political tension among the riparian neighbors,
makes the Arab-Israeli case one of the most seemingly
intractable water disputes to be found anywhere.
Many insightful analyses of the Arab-Israeli water
dispute have examined competing claims for existing
resources (as well as the evolution and legitimacy of
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the West Bank and Israel proper, concluding that
cooperative Israeli-Palestinian management represents a
genuine win-win solution for the riparians. More
focused work by Feitelson and Abdul-Jaber (1997)
examines varying institutional approaches to jointly
managing wastewater in the region of Jerusalem and its
environs.

On the one hand, the implementation of water
conservation measures in all sectors remains a sensible
policy. It has been estimated that freshwater demand in
Israel could be reduced by as much as 15-20 percent
(GTZ and Engineers 1996), an equivalent reduction of
some 280-390 MCM/annum based on 1997 consumption
data reported by the Israeli Hydrological Service (State
of Israel 1999). Potential for water use reductions also
exists on the Jordanian side in the form of increased
irrigation efficiency (through drip and microsprayer
systems) and improvements to the water delivery
infrastructure. The latter is also a critical policy matter
for the Palestinians. “Unaccounted-for” water amounts
to well over 50 percent of water consumption in Jordan
and between 40 percent and 50 percent in the
Palestinian territories (GTZ and CES Consulting
Engineers 1996). In some cases these are bonafide
losses through pipe leakage but in others, the term
“loss” is misleading since the unaccounted-for volume
is explained by un-authorized connections to the
distribution system. The “loss” is an economic loss to
the state (or independent water utility, whatever the case
may be) but it does not represent “wasted” water since
the missing flow is ultimately reaching human end
users.

Municipal Demand Management Will Not Resolve the
Shortfall.
Water availability in the region of the Jordan River
watershed is replete with uncertainty, based largely on
extreme climatic variability. Over the past century, the
coefficient of variation for total annual precipitation
falling over Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, defined as
the sample standard deviation divided by the interannual
mean, is approximately 25 percent (Stanhill and
Rapaport 1988).
One uncertainty is that total water demand in the region
is likely to rise with population. The only eventuality
that could precipitate a leveling off (or even decline) in
demand is a decline in per-capita water use whose
magnitude offsets the concurrent increase in population.
Such a scenario will occur only with a massive
allocation shift of water away from irrigated agriculture
to municipal and industrial users. At the same time, the
sudden and complete diversion of water away from
irrigated agriculture to other uses is neither likely nor
necessarily desirable, since agriculture represents an
established way of life for a significant fraction of the
regional population as well as a form of open-space
protection in much of the region, particularly coastal
Israel.4

Figure 3 (See Figure 3) indicates the present extent of
freshwater shortfall – approximately 500 MCM/annum –
based on the estimates of freshwater availability in the
region and most recent estimates of water consumption.
Two important dynamics must be gleaned from the
figure. First, as discussed above, the bar on the right
side of the balance will inevitably rise as the
conventional water sources on the left side of the
balance will remain fixed. Second, there is substantial
uncertainty associated with water availability based on
climatic variability, as mentioned above. Human use is
responsive to these climatic variations, but not in a
linear way. Policy response to drought in Israel, for
example, is as follows: allocations to urban users remain
unchanged on a per-capita basis while voluntary
municipal conservation campaigns are put in place.
Agricultural water outlays, on the other hand, are
substantially reduced, though not in a direct inverse
relationship with rainfall. In Jordan, water scarcity is so
acute that municipal use is rationed during the summer.
These policy responses are not sufficient to meet
expected increases in demand. Thus we must also turn
to supply augmentation as a means of alleviating
freshwater scarcity. This requires looking past “virtual
water” imports to alternative sources of freshwater, such
as desalination (of both seawater and brackish water),
direct water imports from outside of the immediate
region, and the reclamation of treated wastewater. The
purpose of this paper is to highlight the importance of
these alternative or “unconventional” sources of water,

Relative to the rest of the world, water use in the Middle
East is quite low. While gross mean per-capita water
consumption differs substantially among Israel, Jordan,
and the Palestinian territories (as well as Syria,
assuming its consumption patterns in the Yarmuk basin
are generally similar to those of its Jordanian neighbor),
the regional mean value is extremely low, at ~95
m3/annum (NAS 1999). Israel, whose consumption is by
far the highest among the countries in question, uses an
estimated 330 m3/annum (NAS 1999), half the global
average (Gleick 1993). Hillel (1994) reports that
agricultural water use efficiency is exceedingly high in
the study area, particularly in Israel, relative to other
parts of the world, due to the widespread application of
drip and microsprayer
irrigation technology.
Meanwhile, mean gross non-agricultural water use in
the study area is ~80 m3/annum – nearly a fifth below
minimum water requirement for mixed domestic and
industrial needs proposed by Shuval (Shuval 1992).
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the Santa Barbara, California reverse osmosis facility
for seawater desalination, which was designed to
desalinate 9.3 MCM/yr to 300 ppm TDS at
approximately 45 percent recovery, would require
approximately 50 million kWh/yr. The State asserts that
this value is roughly double the energy requirement for
importing water to the California coast from the
Colorado River, several thousand miles away. Seawater
desalination is several orders of magnitude more
energy-demanding than oil refining or steel production,
whose typical energy requirements for small to midsize
facilities are somewhere around 100,000 kWh/yr
(California Coastal Commission 1999).

particularly with respect to how the implementation of
wastewater reclamation could bear on the water
relations among the riparians of the Jordan River
watershed.

THE “UNCONVENTIONAL SUPPLIES”: AN
OVERVIEW

Seawater Desalination.
Desalination generally refers to any engineered process
that removes dissolved solids (salts) from seawater,
brackish water, or treated wastewater. According to the
State of California, 60 percent of the global desalination
capacity is currently situated in the Persian/Arabian
Gulf region (California Coastal Commission 1999),
where freshwater scarcity is severe and substantial
petroleum-derived capital is available. Throughout the
rest of the Middle East (including the Jordan River
watershed and its environs), implementation of
desalination technology has been limited by its
economic cost relative to the economic cost of
“available” alternatives (such as groundwater, even as
aquifer resources are extracted at rates surpassing that of
recharge).

Estimates of the real economic costs for providing
freshwater from conventional sources in Israel, for
example, range from $0.30-$0.70/m3 in 1996 dollars, as
compared with between $0.70/m3 (GTZ and CES
Consulting Engineers 1996) and $1.50/m3 (in 1993
dollars) for desalination of water whose TDS
concentration is greater than 5000 ppm (Lonergan and
Brooks 1995). In California, seawater desalination costs
are estimated to vary from $0.80 to $3.20/m3 (California
Coastal Commission 1999).
As demand for freshwater increases with population,
and technical innovation lowers costs, desalination
technology is becoming more competitive with other
sources, particularly as freshwater demand outpaces
conventional supplies. Indeed, the Israeli lay press has
already quoted officials at Mekorot, the Israeli
government water company, as arguing that the agency
could produce desalinated water from the Mediterranean
for under $0.70/m3 (Cohen 2000b).

There are two principal technologies for desalination:
distillation and membrane treatment (such as
nanofiltration and reverse osmosis). Distillation
involves evaporating water under high temperatures and
pressures and then capturing the re-condensed and
desalted steam. Membrane treatment describes the
process of forcing saline water through an extremely
fine filter that retains the salts. In each case, the outputs
of the desalination process are twofold: (1) relatively
fresh product water with total dissolved solids (TDS)
concentrations ranging from 1 to 500 parts per million
(ppm) and (2) highly salt-concentrated waste brine. The
volume of freshwater product relative to the volume of
input water is often referred to as the “recovery” rate.
For seawater desalination facilities, the recovery value
generally ranges from 15-50 percent, which is to say
that generally, greater than half of the volume of input
seawater is returned as waste brine with salinities far
higher than that of seawater. Recovery values tend to
increase as the salinity of the input water decreases;
recoveries for brackish water and treated wastewater
desalination, for example, are well above those for
seawater.

Increasing the scale of a proposed facility can vastly
reduce the unit cost of desalination, but it will also
require massive initial capital investment. The Israelis
have already begun appeals for foreign assistance in the
production of an extremely large-scale seawater
desalination plant: an 800 MCM/annum facility that
would be the world’s largest by a factor of four
(Makovsky 1999).5 The largest existing seawater
desalination plant located in Saudi Arabia has a capacity
of approximately 180 MCM/yr.
Indeed, the possibility of construction of such a giant
desalination facility forces a radical rethinking of the
management of water resources in the Jordan watershed
region in general. Until very recently, water resources
development among the riparians of the Jordan River
was treated almost uniformly as a domestic affair.6
Israel constructed its National Water Carrier to deliver
water from the Sea of Galilee to its coastal population
centers, for example, while Jordan built its King
Abdullah (East Ghor) Canal to provide water from the

Largely by virtue of its energy requirements, economic
costs of seawater desalination are extremely high. The
State of California reports that the full-time operation of
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Manavgat and/or Seyhan-Ceyhan Rivers (Turkey), the
Litani River (Lebanon), and the Euphrates River (Iraq).
For exceedingly obvious political reasons, the import of
water from the Iraqi reaches of the Euphrates cannot be
expected to occur in the foreseeable future, nor can it
necessarily be assumed that the Iraqis enjoy a dramatic
water surplus (Beaumont 1998). A transfer from the
Litani River7 is only slightly more imaginable, assuming
a successful conclusion of peace agreements between
Israel and Syria and Lebanon, respectively.

Yarmuk River to Jordanian farmers on the east bank of
the Jordan River. (De facto states of war precluded
genuine cooperative management, although the Unified
Plan offered by American envoy Eric Johnston in 1955
came surprisingly close.)
The notion of installing a large and expensive seawater
desalination facility along the Israeli coast is
inconceivable without some degree of multilateralism,
or what Patricia Wouters (2000) has referred to as
“hydrosolidarity.” In its initial efforts to procure foreign
aid for desalination, Israel has actually floated the idea
of the facility being a truly regional one, serving not
only Israel but also Jordan and the Palestinians
(Makovsky 1999). Large-scale multilateral water
planning of the kind in present discussion represents a
true departure from previous policy. An even more
dramatic feature of the desalination option is that it
would clearly be optimized by the redistribution of large
portions of the inland water resources away from Israel
back to the Arab riparians, while Israeli users along the
coast would consume the desalinated supply. The logic
for such a redistribution would be the massive energy
savings associated with gravity-powered delivery of
water from source to consumer (See Figure 4).

Imports from Turkey, however, are currently the topic
of high-level political discussion between the Israeli and
Turkish governments and can be considered a distinct
possibility. At the time of this writing, an Israeli team of
water managers had just concluded a series of
negotiations with the Turks for the purchase of 45
MCM/annum of freshwater between 2001 and 2003. The
pending purchase has been described by the Israeli
negotiators as an “emergency measure” to meet demand
until desalination facilities can be completed, ostensibly
by 2003 (Cohen 2000b). Though the Turks are likely to
sell the water from the Manavgat River for under
$0.10/m3, the full economic cost of the import will
reach at least $0.85/m3 once taxes and tariffs, shipping,
processing at each port, and connection to the Israeli
National Water Carrier are included. Given these high
costs relative to Mekorot claims of seawater
desalination costs, the Israeli parliament has begun to
consider legislation requiring the immediate planning of
desalination facilities.

The possibility of the construction of a regional
seawater desalination facility will require a level of
technical cooperation largely unseen in the region to
date. For example, in the event that the Sea of Galilee
becomes a reservoir principally for Jordanian or
Palestinian freshwater consumption while remaining
sovereign Israeli territory, Israel must be reasonably
expected and counted upon for proper stewardship of
the lake and protection of its quality. This expectation
can only be conditioned on trust and genuine good
relations far beyond what have been demonstrated in
Israeli-Jordanian or Israeli-Egyptian relations up to the
time of this writing. Without a doubt, it will require
major revisions of existing water agreements between
Israel and Jordan and the Palestinians, respectively, with
more focused attention to be paid to water quality
protection.

Even before verifying that desalinating Mediterranean
seawater can be achieved at the costs that Mekorot
claims, one may question the logic of transporting vast
amounts of freshwater to the region on other grounds.
Presumably, the import is meant to relieve agricultural
irrigation demand as much as municipal demand.
Importing water at relatively high cost, even while the
import of additional cereals and vegetables (virtual
water) is possible at a fraction of the economic cost, is
indeed difficult to justify on efficiency grounds. The
frequently-offered response in the region, as intimated
above, is that choosing virtual water over actual water
imports would incur a substantial social cost among
farm communities. Increased crop imports – as a
substitute for water imports – would be doubly
damaging to local agriculture in that it would also
introduce increased competition.

Water Imports.
Discussions of actual (as opposed to virtual) water
imports to the Middle East from regions blessed with
“surplus” water resources have abounded in recent
years. The conveyance of water may be achieved either
through overland transport (via pipeline) or marine
transport (via tanker, vinyl bags, or submerged
pipeline).
(See Figure 5)
The GTZ and CES
Consulting Engineers (1996) present diversion options
to Israel and/or the Palestinian territories from the

Wastewater Reclamation.
What is frequently left out of discussions of both
desalination and water imports is that the increase of the
upper bound on water availability that results from the
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largely via infection by parasitic and to a lesser degree,
bacterial pathogens (Shuval and Fattal 1999; Cifuentes
1998; Shuval et al. 1997; Shuval et al. 1989; Shuval et
al. 1986; Camann et al. 1983; Clark et al. 1981;
Sanchez-Levya 1976). This research, along with
additional work on pond systems (Mara and Pearson
1999; Mara et al. 1992; Mara and Cairncross 1989), has
demonstrated that virtually any properly designed
treatment system can reliably treat municipal sewage to
safe levels for both restricted and unrestricted irrigation,
at least with respect to pathogenic and oxygen-demand
parameters.

exploitation of the unconventional supplies causes a
resultant increase in the production of wastewater, and
the subsequent availability of treated wastewater as an
alternative source of freshwater. A variety of
technologies exist for treating both domestic and
industrial wastewater to levels sufficient for nonpotable, or with considerably more expense, potable
reuse. In Israel, the volume of reclaimed wastewater
reached 250 MCM in 1994 with the overwhelming
majority of that used to irrigate crops. This value
represents an impressive 65 percent of the combined
domestic/municipal/industrial sewage stream (Eitan
1995).8 (Note however that 20-30 percent of nonirrigation freshwater distributed to end-users never
reaches the sewer system.)

Salinity, however, remains a difficult problem. Indeed,
the otherwise effective low-cost pond/reservoir systems
that are in such widespread use throughout the region
actually tend to increase the salinity of the effluent.
Prominent voices in the region have attempted to bring
the salinity problem to the attention of planners and the
public with indeterminate success. A former Israeli
Water Commissioner argues that irrigating crops with
treated wastewater whose chloride concentrations
surpass 400 ppm ought to be banned due to the threats
that such saline water poses to groundwater quality, soil
quality, and crop yields (Zaslavsky 1999). Others argue
that salinization of soils is a function of irrigation
generally and is not particular to irrigation with
wastewater. In their view, irrigation with treated sewage
– indeed, irrigation with any waters of higher salinity –
may be permissible so long as proper drainage and
water management practices are applied (Shevah 2000).

A CAUTIOUS APPROACH: THE SUPPLY
AUGMENTATION POTENTIAL AND POSSIBLE
ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF WASTEWATER
RECLAMATION
The operative term in this context is “non-irrigation.”
As mentioned above, agricultural irrigation is the
dominant use of freshwater in Israel and Jordan. The
water used to irrigate crops cannot be substantially
reclaimed because, where high-efficiency drip and
microsprayer irrigation systems are largely in place,
most irrigation water is either incorporated into plant
biomass or evapotranspired. No more than about 15
percent of the total volume of freshwater extracted by
Israel for human use is reclaimed for reuse. The
equivalent regionwide percentage in 1994 (again,
excluding Syria) was well under 10 percent, a lower
figure because wastewater reuse is currently less
established in Jordan and negligible in the Palestinian
areas.

Salinity removal has not been a traditional design
objective of wastewater treatment engineering but it is
likely to become a standard feature of treatment systems
in arid regions in years to come. Treated wastewater in
the region can be thought of as brackish water,
containing TDS concentrations in the low (1-5) parts per
thousand (ppt) range. The economic cost of desalinating
brackish water has been estimated at about half that of
desalinating seawater (GTZ and CES Consulting
Engineers 1996; WRI 1992; Glueckstern 1991), and the
sources of exploitable wastewater are well distributed
throughout the region (spatially), whereas seawater
must be conveyed at great distances and up dramatic
topographic gradients to reach consumer centers.

The GTZ and CES Consulting Engineers (1996)
estimate that the volume of additional wastewater
available for reclamation projected out to the year 2040
is nearly 1.5 BCM/annum (p. 17). A more realistic figure
is approximately 1 BCM/annum, still a mighty amount.9
To place this volume in proper context we must take
note of the GTZ/CES projections of total human water
demand in the region in 2040. The range of values
offered is 4.3-5 BCM/annum. Based on these projections
and the above calculation of wastewater reclamation
potential, it appears as though it may be possible to
more than double current rate of sewage reclamation.

It must be recalled, however, that desalination
technologies do not recover the full volume of the input
water (see above). Depending on the influent salinity,
the recovery rate for wastewater is some 60-90 percent,
with the filtrate requiring disposal as waste brine. Thus,
depending on the extent of the implementation of
desalination facilities for sewage reclamation, the
potential for wastewater recovery may be substantially
reduced (while effluent qualities are improved).

Risk and Opportunity.
The option of recycling wastewater is not without its
dangers. Substantial attention has been paid to the
human health risks associated with sewage irrigation,
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disputes are likely to result from lower-than-average
streamflow, as occurred in the spring of 1999 following
two consecutive winters of extremely low precipitation.
A diplomatic crisis resulted from Israel’s initial decision
to deny Jordan portions of the latter’s summer
allocation, ostensibly due to the formers inability to
extract its winter share from the Yarmuk due to low
precipitation in the winter of 1999. Although the dispute
was resolved through quiet negotiation (CNN 1997) and
the Israelis eventually provided Jordan with the volume
it demanded, the dispute would have been avoided
entirely if the treaty’s water sharing had been based on
percentages of annual discharge rather than on fixed
volumes.

THE GEOPOLITICAL CHARACTER OF THE
UNCONVENTIONAL SUPPLIES GENERALLY
AND WASTEWATER RECLAMATION IN
PARTICULAR
A First General Concern: Bilateralism.
Water management plays an important role in both the
existing agreements between Israel and Jordan and
Israel and the Palestinian Authority, as well as in the
ongoing negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian
Authority and between Israel and Syria.
Despite the fact that the water resources under
discussion encompass Israeli, Jordanian, Palestinian,
and Syrian jurisdictions and that there is a committee on
water in the multilateral component of the Middle East
peace process, each of the substantive agreements on
water to date have resulted from bilateral (as opposed to
multilateral) negotiations. Although the bilateral format
has until now been more effective at achieving
agreements, a shortcoming of the approach is that
important third parties in multiriparian basins are left
out of the resolutions. Simply put, the pie tends to be
divided without all the consumers present at the table.
The Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace is an example of such
an agreement, with the waters of the Yarmuk tributary
and the mainstem of the Jordan distributed between
Israel and Jordan as though Syria and the Palestinians
were not riparians to the watershed. In sum, the only
challenge to unilateralism in water development in the
region has been bilateral, rather than basin-wide
multilateral agreement.

Cooperative Management, Variability, and Seawater
Desalination.
These new supplies have a significant bearing on both
cooperative management and attention to climatic
variability in the resolution of water disputes. To begin
with, the introduction of the unconventional supplies
changes the size and makeup of the theoretical pie to be
divided among the riparians through water diplomacy,
forcing a rethinking of the potential of joint water
management policy. Furthermore, these supplies tend to
be far less susceptible to climatic variability than
conventional sources.
The idea of cooperative water management in the region
(and in other conflicted watersheds throughout the
world) has been championed by academics and
practitioners for decades, and can be traced at least as
far back as John Wesley Powell, a nineteenth century
American naturalist and explorer who was among the
earliest critics of unrestrained settlement of whites in the
American West:

A Second General Concern: Ignorance of Variability.
The practice of allocating fixed volumes among
riparians, rather than allocating percentages of variable
flow over some defined time period is a problematic
characteristic of the existing Arab-Israeli water
agreements. In the Israeli-Jordanian case, for example,
Jordan is presently allocated 30 MCM each summer from
the upper Jordan River downstream of the outlet of Sea
of Galilee, 20 MCM of which it receives in return for
Israel’s extractions of 20 MCM from Yarmuk tributary in
winter (Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace 1994 (Annex II,
Articles I.1.b and I.2.a,d.)). This volume, combined with
an additional 25 MCM/annum that Israel guaranteed the
Jordanians under the terms of an agreement reached
between King Hussein and former Prime Minister
Netanyahu at Aqaba in May 1997 (CNN 1997),
amounts to a total fixed volume of 55 MCM/annum.10
Since, as discussed above, streamflow varies as function
of rainfall, the proportion of the annual yield that this
volume represents will differ substantially from year to
year. Thus, in years of low precipitation, intense

[American] states bothered Powell . . . their
borders were nonsensical . . . boxing out
landscapes, sneering at natural reality, they were
wholly arbitrary . . . in the West, where the one
thing that really mattered was water, states should
logically be formed around watersheds . . . to
divide the West up any other way was to sow the
future with rivalries, jealousies, and bitter
squabbles . . . (Reisner 1986).
Although the joint management approach has
historically been judged by negotiators as impractical in
the Middle East context, a recent Israeli newspaper
report is worth citing as evidence of a possible sea
change:
Israel is proposing that a regional water agency in
charge of financing, planning, and developing
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inconceivable barring radical unforeseen circumstances.
As to how reclaimed wastewater must be considered in
this regard in water agreements, apportioning raw
volumes is likely not a useful guide unless planners can
agree that they can accurately predict water
consumption trends several years into the future.
Otherwise, dividing proportions of the sewage
generated each year (like dividing proportions of annual
freshwater yield) is the most sensible approach.

water resources be established in the Middle East.
Foreign Minister David Levy proposed … to his
Jordanian counterpart, Abad el-Ayala Hatib, that a
meeting be arranged so that experts from Israel
and Jordan have a chance to discuss the idea
(Benn 2000).
This piece failed to point out that Minister Levy was
referring strictly to “new source” development and not
those waters historically exploited by the region’s
riparians. Even so, Levy’s declaration is an encouraging
indication that Israel, the dominant riparian power, has a
new willingness to pursue development of the
unconventional supplies in a cooperative and regionally
integrated way. The emerging importance of the
unconventional supplies is yet another argument for a
shift away from the standard zero-sum game analysis of
the Arab-Israeli water dispute. Additionally, procuring
foreign assistance for the construction and operation of
coastal desalination works will almost certainly be
conditioned on regional technical cooperation and the
guarantee that increased freshwater supplies will also
benefit the Palestinian territories and Jordan.

Before considering the question of wastewater
reclamation and joint water management, we must be
clear about the fact that the wastewater will play an
increasing role in the regional water balance in coming
years. Conflicts over sewage are taking on a
substantially different character in Israel and Palestine
than they do almost anywhere else in the world.
When a country discharges wastewater into a
transboundary river or stream sending it into the
territory of a downstream neighbor, the resultant
conflict generally tends to be over the responsibility for
pollution abatement. The grievance of a downstream
riparian is that an upstream neighbor is polluting its
waters. Under conditions of extreme freshwater
scarcity, however, wastewater ceases to be thought of
strictly as a disposal problem and begins to assume the
character of a scarce resource. The operative question
is transformed from: “whose responsibility is
wastewater treatment?” to “who enjoys the benefit of
treated wastewater?”

As for the question of variability: one of the great
advantages of desalination is that it is not climate
dependent. Desalination-derived water supply is
guaranteed year-round. Thus, when desalinated water is
considered in water-sharing or water-allocation
agreements, actual volumes can be reasonably divided.
As discussed above, the same is not true for rainfalldependent conventional supplies, for which proportions
of annual discharge are really the only sensible
parameter to apportion. In the event that desalinated
seawater is considered as part of the regional freshwater
stock, then their distribution among the riparians ought
to be considered separately from the conventional
supplies.

As populations rise and the amount of wastewater
generated by human communities continues to rise, the
stock of available treated wastewater rises in parallel.
There is an increase in the availability of treated
wastewater in absolute terms, but also, and more
importantly, an increase relative to the limited and
stable availability of conventional water supplies.11 In
other words, treated wastewater is likely to become a
much larger relative component of the total available
freshwater stock in coming decades.

While the temporal reliability of seawater desalination
is obviously a major advantage of the technology, it
may become a complicating factor in water diplomacy.
However, the redistribution of supplies that involve the
exchange of a non-climate dependent source with a
dependent one will create complications. The
participants in water diplomacy might add reliability
(climate independence) to simple volumes as a
negotiation objective.

At present, treated wastewater represents a form of
supply augmentation for non-potable12 uses such as
agricultural irrigation, thereby freeing up for direct
human consumption the conventional freshwater
formerly utilized in agriculture. As the present Middle
Eastern drought extends into a third year, Israel may
join Jordan and the Palestinian territories in rationing
municipal freshwater consumption, even as Israel
reduces agricultural allocations of freshwater by 60
percent. The Israeli press cites that in the near future, all
Israeli irrigation is to draw against reclaimed
wastewater exclusively, with conventional freshwater

Wastewater Reclamation and Water Diplomacy.
With respect to variability and the reliability of supply,
wastewater reclamation lands somewhere in the middle.
Indeed, the supply of treated wastewater will necessarily
track human water consumption. The stock will drop
only as municipal consumption drops, which is
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freshwater (albeit not necessarily on an equivalent
volumetric unit basis). There are a variety of creative
water exchanges that could be formulated if water were
to be managed in a truly integrated way. Indeed it has
been convincingly demonstrated that cooperative
management at the watershed level has great potential to
produce synergistic gains (Cohon and Marks 1973).

and desalinated seawater to be reserved for the cities
(Cohen 2000a).
For the Palestinian population, whose present
agricultural consumption of freshwater of any kind is
miniscule (although substantially higher in Gaza than in
the West Bank), the availability of reclaimed
wastewater represents the opportunity for agricultural
development of previously marginal areas. Rather than
discharge municipal wastewater into wadi bottoms in
the West Bank or into the Mediterranean (from the Gaza
Strip), treated effluent could be used in the cultivation
of a variety of foodstuffs and commercial crops.

At the same time, one must acknowledge the difficulty
in predicting the nature of the final regional
accommodation that will be achieved between Israel
and the Palestinians (let alone Israel and Syria).
Reconciling the principle that “good fences make good
neighbors” with the very real advantages of cooperative
water management will surely be a difficult one.

On the other hand, since so little conventional
freshwater is used in Palestinian agriculture, no
substantial drinking water offsets via wastewater
irrigation can be expected from sectoral shifts within the
Palestinian areas alone. Instead, augmentation of the
Palestinian municipal drinking water supply via
wastewater reclamation can only occur through the
provision of conventional freshwater supplies freed up
by the availability of treated sewage to Israeli
agriculture. In other words, the drinking water supply
augmentation potential of treated wastewater in the
Palestinian areas is contingent upon water management
coordinated between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

In the meantime, however, a number of joint wastewater
reclamation projects may be developed as confidencebuilding measures. Two are offered below.
In the first, a substantial proportion of the wastewater
from Jerusalem flows eastward, untreated, through the
Wadi Nah’r/Nahal Kidron drainage toward the Dead
Sea (See Figure 6). The current situation there is
characterized by wasted freshwater, wasted nutrients,
and a threat to public health. A similar case exists in the
northern West Bank, where untreated sewage flows
westward towards Israel proper from Nablus (See
Figure 7).14 In each case, the wastewater possesses a
transboundary character in that it either (1) crosses a
real or proposed jurisdictional boundary or (2)
originates from sewer systems serving with mixed
Palestinian and Israeli populations (as is in the case at
Wadi Nah’r). The advantages of cooperative
reclamation measures to the Palestinian side include
Israeli financial contribution, Israeli technical expertise
(based on several decades of wastewater reclamation in
Israel proper), the production of substantial additional
freshwater for agricultural purposes, and the reduction
of the nuisance and public health hazard of raw sewage
flowing through its territory. The Israeli interests
include, in addition to the production of additional
freshwater and the reduction of public health and
ecological threats, confidence-building measures for
normalization of relations.

Reuse of wastewater depends on proper storage and
conveyance. In Israel, reuse occurs in one of two ways.
In the first, effluent from a centralized urban wastewater
treatment facility, such as the Shafdan facility serving
the Tel Aviv metropolitan area, is transported via
pipeline to agricultural consumers elsewhere in the
country. In this situation, the producers and consumers
of wastewater are separate entities. In the Yizre’el
Valley just southwest of Haifa, for example, effluent
from Haifa’s wastewater treatment plant is pumped
approximately 5 km over gradual sloping terrain and is
stored in a series of ponds for irrigation by farm
collectives outside of the city. In this and other similar
cases, consumers of treated sewage must purchase the
resources from its producers.
In the second scenario, small communities convey their
wastewater to their own reservoirs for combined
treatment and storage.13 Then, the treated wastewater is
conveyed directly over short distances to fields for
irrigation. In this format, producers of wastewater
consume their own sewage via local agriculture. As of
1994, as much as 50 percent of the wastewater in Israel
(by volume) was reclaimed in this way (Eitan 1995).
To relieve extreme drinking water scarcity in the
Palestinian territories, one reasonable solution may be
for Israeli communities downstream of Palestinian cities
to exploit Palestinian sewage in return for conventional
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The Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace distributes the yield
of the Upper Jordan River basin in such a way that
requires the linking of instructures so that water can be
transferred from the Sea of Galilee to Jordanian
conveyance to Amman. See the Treaty’s Annex II,
Articles I.1.b and I.2.a,d.

ENDNOTES
1

7

Syria is often irresponsibly left out of discussions of
the Arab-Israeli water conflict. Indeed, a substantial
portion of the streamflow of the Yarmuk tributary to the
Jordan River is contained within Syrian territory and the
Syrian exploitation of the headwaters of the Yarmuk at
the al-Wehda Dam was estimated to range from 80 to
120 MCM/annum in 1994 (GTZ and CES Consulting
Engineers 1996) and may have risen as high as 200-220
in 1998 (M. Yzraeli, personal
MCM/annum
communication January 2000). Lebanon must also be
considered a riparian to the watershed since one of the
headwaters to the Upper Jordan River, the Hazbani
springs, lie within its territory. However, since Lebanon
is not suffering from water scarcity at anywhere near the
intensity of that suffered by the other riparians, it is left
out of the present discussion.

For discussion of the possibility that Israeli diversion
of the waters of the Litani may already have taken
place, refer to Amery (1998; 1993) and Wolf (1998).

8

This combined sewage volume includes Jewish
settlements in the West Bank and Gaza as well as
portions of several of larger Palestinian cities whose
sewer systems are included in the wastewater
management survey published by the Israeli
government.

9

Assume that close to all of the wastewater produced by
the human communities of the region can be exploited
for reuse in either agricultural or urban irrigation as well
as an aggregated regional sewage production figure of
40 m3/capita/annum. This figure is a populationweighted average that has been adjusted based on the
following additional assumptions: 20 percent of
freshwater distributed to non-agriculture users is either
incorporated, evapotranspired, or returned to surface
and groundwaters without reaching the sewer system;
and existing “un-accounted for” water rates (15 percent
in Israel, 55 percent in Jordan, 40 percent in the West
Bank, and 50 percent in Gaza) will remain unchanged
over the next four decades. If we also assume that per
capita freshwater consumption rates will also remain

2

Aquifers (as opposed to surface waters) may be
extracted at greater than 100 percent of annual recharge.
The word “sustainable” refers in this context to
withdrawals of groundwater at rates no higher than that
of recharge, thereby insuring that existing groundwater
levels are maintained.

3

In statistically rare years of extremely high
precipitation, the total annual renewable freshwater
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constant, then we may very simply estimate the
available reclaimed wastewater volume to equal 40
m3/annum multiplied by the regional population in any
given year. A mid-range population prediction for the
study area for the year 2040 is 28 million. (Note that
this analysis, too, excludes the Syrian component.)
10

The 1997 Aqaba agreement stipulated that the transfer
of the flow to Jordan would last for a period of three
years, although there is a reasonable possibility that
Israel will agree to continue the transfers indefinitely.

11

The term “stable stock” is, of course, a bit of a
misnomer because of the extreme variability in rainfall
on an interannual basis.

12

Improving the quality of effluent from irrigationgrade to drinking water-grade is neither technically
challenging nor particularly expensive, but there is not
yet a readiness on the part of the public to accept that
drinking directly recycled sewage, when properly
treated, is completely safe.

13

For detailed description of hybrid pond/reservoir
treatment systems, see Mara and Pearson (1999) and
Juanico and Dor (1999).

14

In the cases of both Nablus and Jerusalem, the city
lies on the watershed divide, and sewage flows both
eastward and westward into two different watersheds.
The eastern drainage of Nablus, Wadi Fara, is not
considered in this paper since it is likely that the bulk of
the territory through which the stream flows will be
under Palestinian jurisdiction following the final status
agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
Similarly, the western drainage of Jerusalem, Nahal
Sorek, flows almost entirely through Israel and is
currently treated and reused within Israel.
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Figure 1. The surface water resources of the Jordan River watershed along with the shared IsraeliPalestinian coastal drainages.

Figure 2. The major groundwater resources available to the riparians of the Jordan River watershed.
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Figure 3. Crude water balance diagram. Water use figures are for the year 2000, estimated by
multiplying multi-year average per-capita consumption data for each country by population
estimates for the year 2000. The uncertainty range for water availability is derived from an
assumed 25% coefficient of variation for rainfall over the region. The uncertainty range for water
use is based on its non-linear relationship with water availability. Syrian water use assumes a
population of 500,000 in the Yarmuk basin utilizing 200 m3/capita/annum.

Figure 4. Topography of Israel, the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights, rendered in 3-D with a
vertical exaggeration of approximately 50x.

57

Figure 5. Possible international water transfers in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Figure 6. Wadi Nah’r / Nahal Kidron joint reclamation area (proposed).
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Figure 7. Wadi Zaymar / Nahal Alexander joint reclamation area (proposed).
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